

Date **12 JAN 1987**

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. <b>EXA/DA</b>	<b>JA</b>	<b>12 JAN 1987</b>
2. <b>ADDA</b>	<b>JA</b>	<b>12 JAN 1987</b>
3. <b>DDA</b>	<b>SEEN</b>	
4. <b>DDA Registry - FILE</b>		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

**FROM:** (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt		X		
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO		X		
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	D-Exec Staff		X		
18					
19					
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22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE OF  
CA FINDING REGARDING IRAN.

Executive Secretary

9 Jan 87

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

WHITE HOUSE

## WASHFAX RECEIPT

87 JAN 9 11:53

THE WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM.

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JAN 5 12 16 PM '87

Executive Registry

87-0088X

DDA/REG  
LOGGED

MESSAGE NO. 641 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES 4  
 FROM DAN HOWARD 174 CECB  
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Memo. FINDING - RELEASED BY  
WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE - 1/9/87

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>DOD</u>	<u>BOB SIMS</u>	<u>PIA</u>	<u>6979312</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>GEORGE LAUDER</u>	<u>PIA</u>	
<u>DDSD</u>	<u>EXE SEC</u>		
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXE SEC</u>		
<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXE SEC</u>		

REMARKS:

DD/A REGISTRY

FILE: 100-34

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1986

ACTION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JP*

SUBJECT:

Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran

Prime Minister Peres of Israel secretly dispatched his special advisor on terrorism with instructions to propose a plan by which Israel, with limited assistance from the U.S., can create conditions to help bring about a more moderate government in Iran. The Israelis are very concerned that Iran's deteriorating position in the war with Iraq, the potential for further radicalization in Iran, and the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence in the Gulf all pose significant threats to the security of Israel. They believe it is essential that they act to at least preserve a balance of power in the region.

The Israeli plan is predicated on the assumption that moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more moderate Iranian government, the Israelis are prepared to unilaterally commence selling military materiel to Western-oriented Iranian factions. It is their belief that by so doing they can achieve a heretofore unobtainable penetration of the Iranian governing hierarchy. The Israelis are convinced that the Iranians are so desperate for military materiel, expertise and intelligence that the provision of these resources will result in favorable long-term changes in personnel and attitudes within the Iranian government. Further, once the exchange relationship has commenced, a dependency would be established on those who are providing the requisite resources, thus allowing the provider(s) to coercively influence near-term events. Such an outcome is consistent with our policy objectives and would present significant advantages for U.S. national interests. As described by the Prime Minister's emissary, the only requirement the Israelis have is an assurance that they will be allowed to purchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks that they sell to Iran. We have researched the legal problems of Israel's selling U.S. manufactured arms to Iran. Because of the requirement in U.S. law for recipients of U.S. arms to notify the U.S. government of transfers to third countries, I do not recommend that you agree with the specific details of the Israeli plan. However, there is another possibility. Some time ago Attorney

General William French Smith determined that under an appropriate finding you could authorize the CIA to sell arms to countries outside of the provisions of the laws and reporting requirements for foreign military sales. The objectives of the Israeli plan could be met if the CIA, using an authorized agent as necessary, purchased arms from the Department of Defense under the Economy Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving appropriate payment from Iran.

The Covert Action Finding attached at Tab A provides the latitude for the transactions indicated above to proceed. The Iranians have indicated an immediate requirement for 4,000 basic TOW weapons for use in the launchers they already hold.

The Israeli's are also sensitive to a strong U.S. desire to free our Beirut hostages and have insisted that the Iranians demonstrate both influence and good intent by an early release of the five Americans. Both sides have agreed that the hostages will be immediately released upon commencement of this action. Prime Minister Peres had his emissary pointedly note that they well understand our position on not making concessions to terrorists. They also point out, however, that terrorist groups, movements, and organizations are significantly easier to influence through government than they are by direct approach. In that we have been unable to exercise any suasion over Hizballah during the course of nearly two years of kidnappings, this approach through the government of Iran may well be our only way to achieve the release of the Americans held in Beirut. It must again be noted that since this dialogue with the Iranians began in September, Reverend Weir has been released and there have been no Shia terrorist attacks against American or Israeli persons, property, or interests.

Therefore it is proposed that Israel make the necessary arrangements for the sale of 4000 TOW weapons to Iran. Sufficient funds to cover the sale would be transferred to an agent of the CIA. The CIA would then purchase the weapons from the Department of Defense and deliver the weapons to Iran through the agent. If all of the hostages are not released after the first shipment of 1000 weapons, further transfers would cease.

On the other hand, since hostage release is in some respects a byproduct of a larger effort to develop ties to potentially moderate forces in Iran, you may wish to redirect such transfers to other groups within the government at a later time.

The Israelis have asked for our urgent response to this proposal so that they can plan accordingly. They note that conditions inside both Iran and Lebanon are highly volatile. The Israelis are cognizant that this entire operation will be terminated if the Iranians abandon their goal of moderating their government or allow further acts of terrorism. You have discussed the general outlines of the Israeli plan with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Attorney General Meese and Director Casey. The Secretaries do not recommend you proceed with this plan. Attorney General Meese and Director Casey believe the short-term and long-term objectives of the plan warrant the policy risks involved and recommend you approve the attached Finding. Because of the extreme sensitivity of this project, it is recommended that you exercise your statutory prerogative to withhold notification of the Finding to the Congressional oversight committees until such time that you deem it to be appropriate.

### Recommendation

OK NO

*RB* — That you sign the attached Finding.

Prepared by:  
Oliver L. North

### Attachment

Tab A - Covert Action Finding

1000 17 Jan 81

*Printed was briefed verbally from this paper  
VP, Don Regan and Linn Fortin were present*

*JP*

**Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of  
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961  
As Amended, Concerning Operations  
Undertaken by the Central Intelligence  
Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than  
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose  
of Intelligence Collection**

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

**SCOPE****DESCRIPTION****Iran**

Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services, third countries and third parties which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training, guidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities.

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.

The White House  
Washington, D.C.

*Ronald Reagan*